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In 2012, an unprecedented number of four distinct, partially overlapping ﬁlovirus-associated viral
hemorrhagic fever outbreaks were detected in equatorial Africa. Analysis of complete virus genome
sequences conﬁrmed the reemergence of Sudan virus and Marburg virus in Uganda, and the ﬁrst
emergence of Bundibugyo virus in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Published by Elsevier Inc.Results and discussion
Several viruses within the Filoviridae family, including Ebola
virus (EBOV), Sudan virus (SUDV), Taï Forest virus (TAFV), Bundi-
bugyo virus (BDBV), Marburg virus (MARV) and Ravn virus (RAVV),
cause severe viral hemorrhagic fevers (VHFs) with high case-
fatality (Hartman et al., 2010) in several equatorial African coun-
tries. A surveillance program to detect VHFs in Uganda was
formally established in 2010 by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention (CDC), Atlanta, USA, in collaboration with the
Uganda Virus Research Institute (UVRI) and the Uganda Ministry
of Health (UMoH) (MacNeil et al., 2011). Routine serologic and
molecular diagnostic tests for various causative agents of VHF are
performed on suspected case specimens submitted to the VHF
reference laboratory located at UVRI, Entebbe. Between July and
October 2012, alert cases were identiﬁed in Uganda or reported
from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), and specimensInc.were received by the CDC/UVRI VHF Program (Table 1). Four
different ﬁlovirus disease outbreaks were initially identiﬁed by
testing clinical samples via antigen capture, IgM ELISA, and/or qRT-
PCR, using methods that were described before (Shoemaker et al.,
2011; Towner et al., 2006, 2008). Subsequent virus isolation and
complete viral genome sequencing studies were carried out at the
CDC in Atlanta. Samples from patients with fatal and nonfatal
outcomes that tested positive by qRT-PCR and showed low Ct
values were chosen randomly for sequencing full viral genomes.
After each ﬁlovirus disease outbreak was identiﬁed, many
partner organizations were involved in outbreak response, includ-
ing UVRI, UMoH, CDC, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF), DRC
Ministry of Health (DRCMoH), Public Health Agency of Canada
(PHAC) and World Health Organization (WHO). These organiza-
tions collaborated to establish epidemiological investigations,
contact tracing, case management, logistical support, and patient
isolation facilities. A mobile laboratory was established by CDC for
the Ebola VHF outbreak in Isiro, DRC (this laboratory was main-
tained in the late stages of the outbreak by the staff from the
Public Health Agency of Canada). Similarly, CDC established a
mobile laboratory in Kabale, Uganda, during the Marburg virus
Table 1
Locations of outbreaks, dates outbreaks were conﬁrmed and number of conﬁrmed cases.
Location Virus Date of laboratory
conﬁrmation
Last positive laboratory test
(RT-PCR)
♯ of days from detection of 1st case to
last case
♯ of laboratory conﬁrmed cases (♯ of
deaths)
Kibaale, UGA SUDV July 26th, 2012 Aug 5th, 2012 11 11 (4)
Isiro, DRC BDBV Aug 16th, 2012 Oct 11th, 2012 57 36 (13)
Kabale, UGA;
Ibanda, UGA
MARV Oct 18th, 2012 Nov 7th, 2012 21 15 (4)
Luwero, UGA SUDV Nov 13th, 2012 Nov 17th, 2012 5 6 (3)
Fig. 1. Map of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Uganda showing the locations of ﬁlovirus-caused viral hemorrhagic fever (VHF) outbreaks in 2012. Isolation
sites of the most genetically similar viruses from previous years are also shown.
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of the considerable distance between the outbreak epicenters and
the VHF laboratory in Entebbe. The mobile laboratories performed
daily molecular testing on acute suspect cases and on conﬁrmed
cases in isolation wards to ensure patients were not viremic when
they were discharged. The dates of laboratory conﬁrmation of
outbreaks, and time to the last acute case being laboratory
conﬁrmed are shown in Table 1. Once identiﬁed, these outbreaks
were kept relatively small and quickly brought under control,
relative to many of the past ﬁlovirus disease outbreaks. The ability
to rapidly identify acute cases due to the availability of in-country
ﬁlovirus diagnostics likely contributed to these successful control
efforts. Complete reports on the epidemiologic and clinical aspects
of the outbreaks will be presented elsewhere.
Samples from VHF alert cases in the Kibaale District of western
Uganda were received at the CDC/UVRI laboratory in July 2012
(Fig. 1). Differential molecular testing of clinical samples identiﬁed
the outbreak as Ebola virus disease associated with SUDV. Precise
identiﬁcation of the virus as SUDV was achieved at CDC in Atlanta
by sequencing the complete genome of the virus directly from the
clinical samples. Genomic analysis showed ∼99.9% sequence iden-
tity among the virus genomes detected in the four acute case
serum samples. Finding of nearly identical virus sequences is
compatible with a single spillover event from the virus reservoir
into the human population, with subsequent limited waves ofhuman-to-human transmission. Interestingly, these sequences
also showed a high identity (∼99.2%) with the SUDV Nakisimata
isolate (Shoemaker et al., 2011), detected in 2011 in the Luwero
District, Uganda, and with the SUDV Gulu isolate (Towner et al.,
2004) found in the Gulu District of northern Uganda in 2000
(Fig. 2). By the end of the outbreak (ofﬁcially declared on October
4th, 2012) a total of 11 cases had been conﬁrmed by molecular and
serological testing.
In mid-August 2012, samples from VHF alert cases in Isiro and
Dungu Health Zones, Province Orientale in northeastern DRC, were
dispatched to CDC/UVRI by MSF Switzerland staff working in that
region (Fig. 1). The initial diagnostics and subsequent full genome
sequence analysis conﬁrmed the presence of BDBV in the clinical
samples from the Isiro Health Zone, but not the Dungu area. The
analysis showed that the virus genomes present in the Isiro
clinical samples were ∼98.6% identical to those of the original
BDBV isolated in the Bundibugyo District of western Uganda in
2007 (Towner et al., 2008). The high degree of sequence identity
(∼99.2%) found among the viruses detected in four serum samples
from acute cases was again suggestive of a single spillover event
into the human population with subsequent human-to-human
transmission. A total of 36 cases were conﬁrmed by the end of the
outbreak (ofﬁcially declared on November 26th, 2012).
In October 2012, samples were received by CDC/UVRI from VHF
alert cases in the Kabale and Ibanda Districts of southwestern
Fig. 2. Phylogenetic trees comparing representative full-length genomes of ebola-
virus (A) and marburgvirus (B). Evolutionary analyses were conducted in MEGA5
(Tamura et al., 2011), using the neighbor-joining method. Bootstrap values listed at
the nodes provide statistical support for 500 replicates. Scale bar indicates the
number of substitutions per site.
Genomes from 2012 are in red; † indicates fatal cases. Genbank accession numbers
used in A are: FJ968794, EU338380, NC_014373, FJ217162, NC_004161, JN638998,
NC_006432, AF086833, AY354458, and KC242783. SUDV sequences from 2012
outbreaks are: KC545389, KC545390, KC545391, KC545392 and KC589025. BDBV
sequences from 2012 outbreaks are: KC545393, KC545394, KC545395, and
KC545396. Genbank accession numbers used in B are: DQ447654, JX458858,
FJ750958, JX458853, JN408064, FJ750957, DQ447649, DQ217792, DQ447658,
DQ447650, DQ447651, and FJ750953. MARV sequences from 2012 outbreaks are:
KC545387 and KC545388.
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Marburg virus disease outbreak. During the following 3 weeks, a
total of 15 additional cases were conﬁrmed in the districts of
Kabale, Ibanda, Mbarara, and Kampala (Fig. 1, Table 1) based on
testing at the CDC mobile laboratory in Kabale and/or serology at
the VHF laboratory at CDC/UVRI. Preliminary epidemiological
investigations identiﬁed two chains of transmission: (1) a case
infected in Ibanda and spread to persons in Kabale, some of whom
sought care in Kampala, and (2) cases in Ibanda, some of whom
sought care in Mbarara. No epidemiologic data could be found to
link these two clusters, however, sequence analysis of complete
viral genomes in serum samples from one acute case from each
cluster showed nearly identical sequences (∼99.9%) indicating that
these cases were likely part of the same human-to-human
transmission chain. Moreover, these viral genome sequences were
highly similar (∼99.3%) to two MARV isolates previously found in
Rousettus aegyptiacus bats (Fig. 2) captured in 2008 and 2009 in
the nearby Python Cave in Queen Elizabeth National Park,southwest Uganda (Amman et al., 2012). UMoH ofﬁcially declared
the end of the outbreaks in Kabale and Ibanda Districts on
December 21st, 2012.
In November 2012, the UVRI/CDC laboratory received samples
from VHF alert cases in the Luwero District, Uganda and identiﬁed
this as another SUDV outbreak. Over the next few weeks, a total of
six cases were conﬁrmed from the relatively close districts of
Luwero, Jinja, and Nakasongola. There were only 5 days between
the laboratory diagnosis of the ﬁrst and last acute cases (Table 1).
Nearly identical (∼100%) virus NP gene sequences were found for
the viruses detected in three serum samples, suggesting a single
chain of human-to-human transmission. Moreover, the full-length
genomic sequence obtained from a viral isolate showed a closest
identity to the SUDV Gulu strain isolated in Uganda in 2000
(Towner et al., 2004), with the SUDV Kibaale isolates identiﬁed
earlier in 2012 being more distant. The end of the outbreak was
ofﬁcially declared on Jan 16th, 2013.Conclusions
In summary, continuous VHF surveillance, established by CDC,
UVRI, and UMoH, combined with rapid laboratory testing, allowed
the identiﬁcation and conﬁrmation of four ﬁlovirus disease out-
breaks during the second half of 2012. Following initial ﬁlovirus
identiﬁcation by conventional serological methods and qRT-PCR,
sequence characterization of complete viral genomes from clinical
samples conﬁrmed the reemergence of SUDV and MARV in
Uganda, and the ﬁrst emergence of BDBV in DRC. Prior to 2012,
BDBV had only been detected in a single outbreak in western
Uganda in 2007 (Towner et al., 2008).
Several lines of evidence strongly indicate that bats are a likely
natural reservoir for EBOV and MARV (Amman et al., 2012; Leroy
et al., 2005; Pourrut et al., 2007; Towner et al., 2007, 2009). Indeed,
MARV and Ravn viruses have been repeatedly isolated from the
common African fruit bat, R. aegyptiacus (Amman et al., 2012;
Towner et al., 2009). Moreover, the seasonal pattern of MARV
circulation in R. aegyptiacus bats has been tentatively linked to a
high risk of infection in humans (Amman et al., 2012). Interestingly,
the timing of this Marburg virus disease outbreak in Uganda
coincides with the second annual virus pulse in bat populations.
Ongoing ecological investigations are currently underway to exam-
ine the potential origins of the virus spillover events initiating these
recent outbreaks. Furthermore, our sequence analysis indicated the
reemergence of SUDV as two single, but independent chains of
transmission events in July and October 2012.Acknowledgments
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